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Abstract
T he ECB could hardly afford political neutrality, even in the monetary union’s “honeymoon phase”. Being a stateless central bank entailed striking 
compromises between confl icting (national) monetary policy preferences. 
However, such compromises would often be reached at the expense of theoretical 
consistency and to the detriment of coherence in the ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy. And, perhaps inevitably, they would also bear the mark of the dominant 
partner in the European Monetary System, that is prior to the establishment of 
the monetary union, now also being the biggest subscriber to the ECB’s capital. 
Political neutrality and, for that matter, monetary activism on the part of the 
ECB -as well as liquidity in the euro-area- were largely inadequate during the 
euro area crisis, especially in its early phase. They were subsequently increased, 
but at a slow pace and in a preferential fashion, that is, largely to the benefi t 
of the banking industry. Eventually, the ECB did try to make a virtue of 
necessity; yet, this could only go so far. Thus, the ECB has reluctantly become 
the only game in town, its reluctance being mostly associated with the overriding 
concerns of certain national central banks of the Eurosystem, most notably the 
Bundesbank; namely, ensuring monetary dominance, averting (at that time 
illusory) infl ationary dangers, preventing moral hazard, enforcing structural 
reforms and, not least, fending off any, indirectly emerging, type of transfer 
union. Therefore, the ECB could have no great ambitions; its lonely game was 
unlikely to produce a medal-winning policy maker in the world championship of 
central banking.
KEY-WORDS: ECB, central bank independence, monetary policy, monetary 
policy strategy, transmission mechanism, zero lower bound, lender of last resort, 
investor of last resort.
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Την ανάγκην φιλοτιμίαν ποιούμενη; Η πολιτική οικο-
νομία της νομισματικής πολιτικής της ΕΚΤ, 1999-2019 
Νίκος Κουτσιαράς, Αναπληρωτής Καθηγητής
Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών 
Περίληψη
Η ΕΚΤ δεν θα ήταν δυνατόν να παραμένει πολιτικώς ουδέτερη – ούτε καν στην διάρκεια της πρώτης και σχετικώς ανέφελης περιόδου της νομισματικής ένω-
σης. Είναι μια κεντρική τράπεζα χωρίς πατρίδα και τούτο συνεπάγεται την ανάγκη 
συμβιβασμών μεταξύ αποκλινουσών εθνικών προτιμήσεων νομισματικής πολιτι-
κής. Τέτοιοι συμβιβασμοί επιτυγχάνονται, όμως, εις βάρος της θεωρητικής συνέπει-
ας και της συνοχής της στρατηγικής νομισματικής πολιτικής. Και, αναπόφευκτα, 
αντανακλούν την επιρροή του κυριάρχου εταίρου στο Ευρωπαϊκό Νομισματικό Σύ-
στημα, τουτέστιν πριν από την εγκατάσταση της νομισματικής ένωσης∙ αυτού που 
σήμερα καταβάλλει την μεγαλύτερη (εθνική) εισφορά στο κεφάλαιο της ΕΚΤ. Η 
πολιτική ουδετερότητα και, κατά την ίδια λογική, η προενεργός νομισματική πο-
λιτική -όπως και η ρευστότητα- ήσαν ανεπαρκείς στην κρίση της ευρωζώνης, ιδίως 
κατά την αρχική φάση της. Ενισχύθηκαν κατόπιν, ωστόσο με βραδύ ρυθμό και τρό-
πο προτιμησιακό, δηλαδή, εν πολλοίς προς όφελος των τραπεζών. Η ΕΚΤ κάποια 
στιγμή, πράγματι, προσπάθησε να κάνει ό,τι μπορούσε -να κάνει την ανάγκη φιλο-
τιμία- όμως η δράση της δεν ήταν δυνατόν να παραγάγει μεγάλα αποτελέσματα. Η 
ΕΚΤ έγινε, διστακτικώς, ο μοναδικός πρωταγωνιστής. Οι δισταγμοί της απηχούσαν 
της ανησυχίες ορισμένων εθνικών κεντρικών τραπεζών, κυρίως της γερμανικής κε-
ντρικής τράπεζας – και συνδέονταν με την επιβεβαίωση της νομισματικής κυριαρ-
χίας, την παρεμπόδιση του (φαντασιακού) ενδεχόμενου πρόκλησης πληθωριστικών 
πιέσεων, την αποσόβηση του ηθικού κινδύνου, την προώθηση των διαρθρωτικών 
μεταρρυθμίσεων και, ασφαλώς, με την αποτροπή του ενδεχόμενου σχηματισμού, 
εμμέσως, μιας ένωσης μεταβιβάσεων. Η ΕΚΤ δεν θα μπορούσε να έχει μεγάλες φι-
λοδοξίες. Μπορεί να υπήρξε ο μοναδικός πρωταγωνιστής στη διαχείριση της κρί-
σης, όμως υπολειπόταν των άλλων μεγάλων κεντρικών τραπεζών. 
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: ΕΚΤ, ανεξαρτησία κεντρικών τραπεζών, νομισματική πολι-
τική, στρατηγική νομισματικής πολιτικής, μηχανισμός μετάδοσης, κατώτατο μη-
δενικό όριο, δανειστής ύστατης καταφυγής, επενδυτής ύστατης καταφυγής.
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1. Aspiring to be boring?
“Successful monetary policy should be boring. Successful central bankers should 
be seen as neither heroes nor villains, but simply as competent referees, allowing 
the game to fl ow.”
(The Economist, 1999:36) 
Twenty years ago, Mervyn King, former governor of the Bank of England, said that successful central banking is boring – being boring should be the 
aspiration of the Bank of England, he proclaimed in front of a delighted audience 
in Plymouth. Ten years ago, Eric Leeper, now at the University of Virginia, made 
a sharp contrast between monetary and fi scal policy: the former has achieved the 
status of science, whilst fi scal policy is still alchemy, its use (and misuse) being 
grounded mostly in politics, not economics (Leeper, 2010); the monetary policy-
as-science view had earlier been articulated in Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999; 
however, a humbler perception is suggested in Blinder, 1997, esp. p. 17; and a 
strictly critical argument is made in White, 2013). 
Surely, the fi nancial crisis and the Great Recession have put such procla-
mations to rest. Instead of boredom, Sir Mervyn and his colleagues have felt 
both the anxiety and the excitement which are likely to arise when navigating 
uncharted waters. And they have found themselves very often criticised and ac-
cused of various sorts of things, apart from being boring. At the same time, the 
scientifi c authority of monetary policy has been seriously challenged as central 
banks have broadened their operational framework employing non-standard 
policy instruments which might have worked in practice, despite their being 
theoretically disputed.1 
Yet, for the ECB, the second most powerful central bank in the world, bore-
dom has mostly been akin to an “inaccessible ideal”. The phrase was coined by 
Gerard Debreu in order to denote what theoretical physics had actually been 
for early economic theory and to describe how striving for that ideal grew into 
a strong stimulus in the mathematisation of economic theory and its scientifi c 
advancement (Debreu, 1991). Which brings us to the monetary policy-as-sci-
ence issue, but only to question the relevance of that argument in the case of 
the ECB, regardless of the time and stage of the European monetary unifi ca-
tion process.  As a matter of fact, the monetary policy strategy of the ECB has 
seldom been free of controversies, obviously not during the negotiations on 
making the European monetary union and designing its central bank (James, 
2012, esp. pp. 304-317), nor following realisation of the single monetary pol-
icy for the euro area. Although such controversies are technical in character 
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and content, they fundamentally refl ect clashes of ideas (James, 2012;  Brun-
nermeier et al., 2016).  Yet, ideas about money and monetary policy are often 
demarcated along national lines and, thus, aligned to national interests and 
policy preferences. Notwithstanding the role of technocrats in resolving mon-
etary policy disputes, a role that was prominent during the negotiations and 
has formally been exclusive -that is, institutionally independent- following the 
establishment of the single monetary policy, politics has implicitly, at least, 
thrown its weight around. 
Feelings of anxiety and excitement had in all likelihood been prevalent 
amongst policymakers of the newly established ECB. Besides maintaining price 
stability per se, affi rming their anti-infl ationary credibility and upholding their 
reputation for effectively minimising the ECB’s loss function had certainly been 
daunting tasks, albeit crucial in order to keep infl ation expectations fi rmly an-
chored. Thus, during the fi rst decade of the economic and monetary union -its 
nice decade, to borrow again a metaphor from one of Mervyn King’s speeches-2 
a lot of ECB intellectual capital and institutional resources were spent in forg-
ing, calibrating and reforming its monetary policy strategy. Putting in place and 
adjusting its decision-making procedures and rules of conduct, whilst reinforcing 
the microeconomic foundations of the monetary union, had also loomed large in 
the ECB agenda. 
In spite of the self-congratulatory and optimistic tone of offi cial reports pub-
lished on the occasion (for example, Commission EC, 2008), the tenth anniversa-
ry of the European monetary union marked the beginning of a nasty second dec-
ade -to make use of another metaphor-3 associated with the global fi nancial crisis 
and, in particular, the euro area crisis. The ECB has since, reluctantly is often 
said, been the only game in town;4 or, so the argument goes. Yet, fending off the 
(twice) heightened risk of currency redenomination, ensuring fi nancial stability 
and providing for macroeconomic stabilisation have called for the introduction 
of new -so-called unconventional, or non-standard- policy instruments as well as 
making intensive use of the existing -conventional, or standard- ones. Discretion 
has, for all intents and purposes, outweighed rules in monetary policy-making, 
whilst policy choices and realisation of trade-offs have inevitably involved an 
element of experimentation, thereby often producing unforeseen direct or side 
effects and giving rise to unintended consequences. Furthermore, the ECB has 
assumed hitherto untried, if controversial roles. 
Therefore, the powers and capabilities of the ECB have been stretched to 
their limit and that has caused fi erce disputes pertaining to the economic sound-
ness and legal legitimacy of ECB policies. In case there had ever been a doubt, 
resignations of three German members of the ECB’s Governing Council -two 
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of them being also members of its Executive Board- have clearly made evident 
that clashes of ideas and divergence of preferences as to the monetary (and the 
fi scal, for that matter) order in the euro area have been running deeper, much 
to the detriment of market and people’s perceptions of the authority of the ECB. 
Thus, politics has, perhaps unsurprisingly, been making inroads into the po-
litically independent realm of European central banking. Not only have leading 
politicians in some euro area countries been furiously critical of ECB policies, 
but they also have, somehow paradoxically, been alleging that the ECB has ef-
fectively compromised its independence. Perhaps again, for all its achievements 
and shortcomings the ECB should invariably -that is, on both positive and nor-
mative grounds- be treated as the manager of a stateless currency, a technocrat 
on paper but a politician of sorts in the real world, especially when things turn 
sour. However, such an arrangement may be destined to fail. 
This paper elaborates on the aforementioned arguments, thereby develop-
ing a political economy perspective on the ECB’s monetary policy and practice. 
Thus, in the next section an attempt is made to assess the role and appraise the 
performance of the ECB during the ten years following the introduction of the 
single currency. The third section deals with the response of the ECB to the glob-
al fi nancial crisis and to the euro area crisis and its aftermath; it focuses on the 
functions undertaken, the instruments employed and the reforms put into effect, 
but also delves into the controversies surrounding the ECB’s activist stance. The 
fi nal section concludes; and it also touches upon the main issues relating to the 
ECB’s monetary policy at the zero lower bound and the questions and dilemmas 
raised in redrafting the central bank’s monetary policy strategy. 
To that effect, the ECB and its monetary policy are placed, albeit cursorily, 
within the broader institutional context of the European monetary and economic 
union. Besides, neither assessing the role and the performance of the ECB thus 
far, nor advising on its monetary policy strategy henceforth could accurately and 
fairly be accomplished, unless attention was duly paid to the constraints built 
into the institutional set-up of the monetary union – but also, to the second-order 
incentives which might be likely to ensue.
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2. Going by the book, with strings attached 
“Some observers have criticised the strategy as ‘asymmetric’. In other words, 
they argue that the Eurosystem is more concerned about infl ation than it is 
about defl ation… I reject this criticism. The use of the word ‘increases’ in the 
defi nition imposes a fl oor of at least zero for the lower bound… Let me state cat-
egorically, as I have often done in the past, that neither prolonged infl ation nor 
prolonged defl ation in the euro area would be deemed by the Governing Council 
to be consistent with the maintenance of price stability… Others criticise the 
‘prominent role of money’ in our strategy… I do not agree with these criticisms of 
the role of money in our strategy. There is little doubt that monetary aggregates 
in the euro area exhibit a close relationship with infl ation…” 
(Willem F. Duisenberg, 1999)
T he statutory objectives of the ECB are clearly prescribed in the Treaty on European Union – and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Un-
ion. The ECB’s primary objective is to maintain price stability. And provided 
that the objective of price stability is fulfi lled -without prejudice to the objective 
of price stability, in Treaty language- the ECB can take into account growth and 
full employment – the ECB supports the general economic policies in the Euro-
pean Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of 
the European Union, in Treaty language. Accordingly, the ECB is mandated to 
defi ne and implement monetary policy for the euro area. Yet, in relation to other 
tasks, most notably safeguarding fi nancial stability and prudential supervision 
of credit institutions, the ECB is only assigned a contributing role – but since 
2014 the ECB has been entrusted with the role of banking supervision in the 
European Banking Union, thereby having been brought into line with several 
central banks’ institutional and policy acquis.
The monetary policy strategy of the ECB was fi rst announced by its Govern-
ing Council in October 1998, three months before the introduction of the euro. 
It entailed two interrelated aspects, namely defi nition of price stability and the 
framework for the analysis of price developments and risks to price stability; and 
thus, it also provided the skeleton for communicating the policy actions of the 
ECB, whilst allowing for the ECB being held publicly accountable in a comprehen-
sive way. Specifi cally, the Governing Council adopted a quantitative defi nition of 
price stability as a year-on-year increase of below 2% in the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices for the euro area as a whole, at the same time placing emphasis 
on the medium-term orientation of the monetary policy of the ECB – however, pre-
cluding intentions to depict the medium-term orientation as a fi xed term horizon. 
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Yet, the most distinguished aspect of the monetary policy strategy of the 
ECB was its so-called two-pillar framework for the analysis of price develop-
ments and risks to price stability. The fi rst pillar attributed a prominent role 
to money, thus echoing the fundamental conception of the quantity theory of 
money: in the long term, infl ation and, for that matter, defl ation are monetary 
phenomena. In that vein, a guideline for the growth of a broad monetary aggre-
gate -in particular 4.5% annual growth of M3- was also endorsed by the Govern-
ing Council. In parallel to the monetary pillar -but not quite on a par, at least 
by way of nominal ordering- a second pillar was inserted within the analytical 
framework. Thus, price developments and risks to price stability were (also) ap-
praised on the basis of (other than monetary, but not preset) economic and fi -
nancial indicators, that is, measures of causally relevant economic and fi nancial 
variables. In that sense, the second pillar refl ected the New Keynesian approach 
to monetary theory and macroeconomics.5 
The monetary policy strategy of the ECB was carefully explained. The 
quantitative defi nition of price stability was thought to strengthen the ECB’s 
accountability since it implied that the ECB would have to explain contingent 
deviations of infl ation from its own benchmark. And that was also deemed to 
provide for better anchoring of medium and long-term expectations (Issing et 
al., 2003). Furthermore, the medium-term orientation of the ECB’s monetary 
policy was highlighted for its properly taking into account the variable and at 
times protracted lags in the transmission of monetary policy shocks, thereby 
ditching excessive policy activism and motivating the ECB to act in a forward-
looking fashion (Hartmann and Smets, 2018). Besides, focusing on the medium 
term would enable the ECB to appropriately respond to supply shocks, especially 
oil price increases, as it effectively directs attention to the second-round (wage 
and price) effects of such price increases, whilst averting virtually unwarranted 
policy actions which might also induce volatility and threaten employment and 
output stabilisation. As a matter of fact, it had already been shown that, regard-
less of the specifi cation of the objective of price stability -whether it is a price 
level target or an infl ation target- a prolonged policy horizon amounts to a higher 
weight on output stabilisation (in the reaction function or the loss function of a 
central bank), (Smets, 2003; also Svensson, 1997).6
Turning to the two-pillar analytical framework, it was maintained that, by 
giving prominence to the role of money and on account of money’s medium to 
long-term neutrality, the medium-term orientation of the monetary policy of the 
ECB was practically ascertained. Furthermore, monitoring the growth of money 
-maybe, alongside other monetary indicators- was thought to provide timely in-
dication of risks to fi nancial stability; besides, asset price infl ation and, in par-
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ticular, asset price bubbles can destabilise economic activity and threaten price 
stability (Issing et al., 2003). Hence, focusing on monetary developments could, 
in theory, prompt the ECB to adopt a leaning-against-the-wind policy stance – 
yet, there has been no evidence that the monetary policy of the ECB has ever 
taken that course of action (Hartmann and Smets, 2018). 
The two-pillar analytical framework allowed for harnessing information 
on both long-term price movements -propelled by money growth- and high fre-
quency movements of infl ation -driven by supply and demand developments 
and, thus, being the subject of analysis within the economic pillar. In other 
words, the two-pillar framework allowed for cross-checking of long and short-
term determinants of infl ation, thereby advancing on the conventional prac-
tice -including the time horizon- of projection, and possibly ensuring that the 
monetary policy of the ECB is on the right track (Issing et al., 2003). Lest it be 
understated, the two-pillar framework and, in particular, the prominent role of 
money should, perhaps primarily, be conceived as a form of collateral pledged 
in order for the ECB to borrow the Bundesbank’s credibility for price stability 
(more on that later) – and/or as evidence of the unrivalled infl uence of German 
and other like-minded central bankers. 
For all its rationalization, the monetary policy strategy of the ECB was not 
indubitably justifi ed. Mainstream academic criticism -not least from macroecono-
mists attesting to the New Keynesian “divine coincidence” conception of infl ation 
targeting (Blanchard and Gali, 2007)- drew attention to various shortcomings in 
the ECB’s quantitative defi nition of price stability. Thus, reliance on the Harmo-
nised Index of Consumer Prices was found to impart an upward bias in the (so 
measured) headline rate of infl ation – although the actual rate of infl ation might 
well be lower. On top of that, the core (or underlying) rate of infl ation was thought 
to (more) accurately refl ect medium to long-term price developments, by fi ltering 
out of headline infl ation volatile food and energy prices, computational misgiv-
ings notwithstanding. More importantly, the 2% ceiling in the defi nition of price 
stability -associated with the lack of a lower bound- was said to be inherently 
asymmetric, thereby giving rise to the risk of undesirably low infl ation, if not out-
right defl ation (see inter alia Wyplosz, 2003; De Grauwe, 2005, esp. chapter 8).7 
Besides asymmetry as such, the 2% ceiling was deemed to be very low, or 
for that matter, excessively aggressive owing to various considerations. Thus, 
downward nominal wage rigidities, perhaps related to both employees’ and em-
ployers’ distaste of nominal wage cuts, imply that some infl ation -maybe high-
er than the ECB’s 2% ceiling- is conducive to easier reduction of real wages, 
thereby providing for a speedier adjustment of the economy to shocks (Akerlof 
et al., 1996). Moreover, infl ation differentials within the euro area are wide and 
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persistent. Therefore, in countries inhabiting the low end of the distribution of 
infl ation rates the unpleasant effects of downward nominal rigidities -mainly 
unemployment- could be magnifi ed, whereas in countries residing in the upper 
end of the distribution there is a substantial risk of infl ationary dynamics be-
coming entrenched. What is more, asymmetries across the countries of the euro 
area exist both with regard to the macroeconomic shocks to which countries are 
exposed and in respect of the transmission of monetary policies. Thus, reliance 
of interest-rate setting decisions on monetary union-wide data only -that is, lack 
of accounting for national infl ation and output gap projections- could result in 
sub-optimal monetary policies (De Grauwe and  Sénégas, 2003) – thereby, also 
reinforcing the growth of infl ation differentials (more on that later). Last but not 
least, the 2% ceiling may fall short of safeguarding against the event of interest 
rates hitting the zero-lower bound. 
Criticism was directed towards the prominent role attributed to money, mon-
etary analysis and, ergo, the two-pillar analytical framework of the ECB’s strategy 
too. Fundamentally -that is, at the level of theoretical foundations and empirical 
observation and largely echoing Keynesian ideas- doubts were raised with regard 
to the defi nition of money and the M3 approximation, the (assumed) stability of 
money demand and the predictability of price developments on the basis of broad 
monetary aggregates, to mention but a few – arguably, the main points at issue. 
Additionally, the two-pillar framework, in particular the monetary pillar, was said 
to function poorly when it comes to communicating the ECB’s stance. That was 
ascribed to misinterpretations being given rise to (for example, concerning the 
exact meaning and scope of the reference value for the rate of growth of M3). And 
it consequently was pinned on noise being effectively imported, thereby distorting 
the public’s understanding and markets’ perception of ECB’s signals. 
In their detailed analysis of the ECB’s monetary policy during its fi rst twen-
ty years, senior ECB offi cials Philipp Hartmann and Frank Smets (2018, esp. 
pp. 14-17 ) explain inter alia the central bank’s reactions to macroeconomic and 
monetary developments and risks in the course of the ECB’s fi rst interest cycle 
or, the fi rst business cycle managed by the ECB – to borrow the two co-authors’ 
dual characterisation of the period January 1999-June 2003. The main factors 
driving business cycle fl uctuations in the euro area -and main issues of concern 
for the ECB- consisted in volatility in global fi nancial markets, variations in oil 
and import prices, movements in the euro exchange rate, and (uncertainty in-
citing) geopolitical tensions. Thus, in response to changing macroeconomic con-
ditions -in essence, infl ation and output forecasts- the ECB’s monetary policy 
moved through phases of loosening and tightening. More concretely, the interest 
rate on the main refi nancing operations (the ECB’s main policy rate) was re-
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duced from 3% to 2.5% in April 1999,8 whilst a series of interest rate increases 
were engineered between November 1999 and October 2000, by that time bring-
ing the main policy rate to 4.75%. Yet, those interest rate increases were later 
more than offset. Indeed, between September 2001 and June 2003 the ECB cut 
its policy rates by a total of 275 basis points; as a result, in June 2003 the main 
policy rate was brought to a then historic low level of 2%. 
During those fi rst four and a half years of the ECB, price stability -at least 
in the ECB’s own defi nition- was mostly maintained. As a matter of fact, in early 
1999 infl ation rates were very low, even reaching levels lower than 1%. That was 
largely accounted for by the earlier disinfl ationary policies which, alongside fi s-
cal consolidation, were earnestly pursued by member states’ authorities in order 
to meet the convergence criteria, thereby becoming eligible to adopt the single 
currency (Praet et al., 2019). Subsequently, though, average annual infl ation 
rose and peaked at 3% in early 2001, on the back of strong output growth and, 
also, reinforced by a rapidly depreciating euro exchange rate. Following concert-
ed foreign exchange interventions by the ECB, the Fed and the Bank of Japan 
in September 2000, the euro exchange rate appreciated considerably, whilst the 
growth outlook took a turn for the worse. Thus, although average annual infl a-
tion hovered slightly above 2% from 2000 to mid-2003, no infl ationary pressures 
were seriously contemplated. As a matter of fact, long-term infl ation expecta-
tions were evidently drifting down and, with interest rates having fallen to a 
historically low level, the risk of nominal interest rates hitting the zero-lower 
bound was unlikely to be dismissed in academic and policy debates (Praet et al., 
2019; for an early identifi cation and analysis of that risk in the then prevailing 
economic circumstances, see Krugman, 1998). 
The fi rst business cycle managed by the ECB was thought to contain enough 
evidence that the ECB did acquire (the much sought after) anti-infl ation cred-
ibility (Hartmann and Smets, 2018). Leaving aside the defi nitional nuances and 
the theoretical, empirical and policy-focused controversies surrounding the issue 
of anti-infl ation credibility (see Forder, 2004 and references therein; for a closely 
related argument see Posen, 1995), one might, yet, question such an unquali-
fi ed verdict. Not only was the emerging risk of a liquidity trap likely to turn the 
objective of anti-infl ation credibility on its head -at least, to foster perceptions 
of that being the case- but the intellectual integrity and persuasiveness of the 
ECB’s claim of anti-infl ation credibility might also be cast in doubt in view of 
the inconsistencies pertaining to the central bank’s implementation of monetary 
policy. What was primarily at issue was the real role attributed to money -and 
the actual relevance of monetary analysis- in the ECB’s practice. For instance, 
money growth (M3) in excess of the reference value was no deterrent to the 
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ECB’s lowering of policy rates in April 1999, whereas it was argued to dispel 
the case for further interest rate cuts in 2003. But, if the coherence of the ECB’s 
monetary policy was disputed, one might also wonder whether the achievement 
of price stability refl ected the competence and, for that matter, the credibility of 
the central bank. One might, instead, consider that the job of the ECB -admit-
tedly, of other central banks too- was being made much easier with increasing 
globalisation (on the disinfl ationary effects of globalisation, see Pain et al., 2008; 
also Rogoff, 2003); or, that luck had simply not been scanty. 
The 2003 review of the monetary policy strategy of the ECB was an attempt 
to address such criticisms. It led to two main changes. First, the objective of price 
stability was redefi ned – clarifi ed, in the ECB’s jargon. Thus, the Governing 
Council would aim at a yearly infl ation rate of below but close to 2% over the me-
dium term. Second, the (prominent) role of money -the monetary pillar- would be 
downgraded. That was refl ected in the decisions to end the annual review of the 
reference value for M3 and restructure the introductory statements of the Presi-
dent at the monthly press conferences on the ECB’s monetary policy, thereby 
putting economic analysis ahead of the monetary analysis. Those changes were 
mostly welcome by academic economists advocating infl ation targeting. By rede-
fi ning the objective of price stability, it was reckoned, the risk of undesirably low 
infl ation was curtailed and the probability of the nominal interest rates hitting 
the zero-lower bound much lowered. Downgrading the role of money growth was 
also consistent with empirical evidence on instability in the demand for money; 
also, fl uctuations in M3 growth were evidently not linked to medium-term price 
developments (Hartmann and Smets, 2018, p. 18). 
Besides, borrowing the Bundesbank’s anti-infl ation credibility was likely to 
be no longer needed. If “credibility is won through systematic, coherent action” 
(Issing, 2005, p. 71), the ECB had probably done its bit. After all, the establish-
ment of the monetary union was no less than a major regime change associated 
with almost pure (Knightian) uncertainty in regard to the structural properties 
and the statistical regularities describing the euro area and fed into the ECB’s 
economic model (Rostagno et al., 2019). And the 2003 review was precisely an 
attempt to remove remaining contradictions. Yet, downgrading the role of money 
growth also meant that a formal excuse for opting for a leaning-against-the-wind 
approach, in case there was a risk to fi nancial stability, was effectively relin-
quished. What is more, the 2003 review did little to address infl ation differen-
tials across the euro area countries. One could thus argue that, at that time, it 
mostly catered to the preferences of the low-infl ation countries of the core of the 
euro area. Alas, the 2003 review also marked the beginning of a period of grow-
ing fi nancial and macroeconomic imbalances (2003-2007). 
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Indeed, the thorniest issue -arguably, those espousing the theory of endog-
enous optimal currency areas would not use that or any synonymous adjective- 
was that of sizable and persistent infl ation differentials between euro area econ-
omies ( Darvas and Wolff, 2014).9 Such differentials may be caused by temporary 
factors, primarily including divergent cyclical developments and dissimilar fi scal 
policies, as well as structural factors, in particular the so-called Balassa-Samu-
elson effect. The latter attributes infl ation differentials to diverse productivity 
trends between the tradable and the non-tradable sectors; and it relates such 
productivity trends to economic convergence across euro area countries. Hence, 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect describes an equilibrium process. Regardless of 
their underlying cause, infl ation differentials and the associated current-account 
disruptions are mitigated via adjustments in the real exchange rate (Koutsiaras, 
2005, esp. pp. 44-5). Yet, structural imbalances are ultimately remedied as a re-
sult of investment capital fl owing into the (higher-productivity) tradable sectors 
in lower-income euro area countries (Koutsiaras and Manouzas, 2016). 
As previously mentioned, not only infl ation differentials per se, but broad-
er and deeper asymmetries across the euro area countries imply that the ECB 
should not exclusively rely on monetary union aggregates when setting its policy 
rates; it should also pay suffi cient attention to the relevant national (macro-)eco-
nomic indicators. In a similar vein, discussion is often made on the appropriate, 
yet implicit, country weighting scheme in the ECB’s reaction function -that is, 
the weighting scheme for national policy-rate preferences- in order for the loss of 
monetary autonomy to be less costly and national business and infl ation cycles to 
be better synchronised. This is an empirical matter; still, the literature remains 
inconclusive (an attempt at estimating implicit country weights in the ECB’s 
reaction function is made in Sturm and  Wollmershäuser, 2008; see also Pereira 
and Tavares, 2019). It is no less a political question, pitting the preferences of 
the high-income, low-infl ation, surplus countries -in effect, the core countries- 
against the preferences of the low-income, high-infl ation, defi cit ones – in effect, 
the peripheral countries. That being the case, the ECB’s monetary policy could 
neither be optimal for all, nor actually depoliticised. 
No doubt, redressing infl ation differentials and current-account imbalances 
depends, to no small extent, on (national) fi scal policies. Thus, it hinges on fi s-
cal stability, including compliance with the numerical rules of the Stability and 
Growth Pact and countercyclical fi scal policy;10 and, in general, it bears on the 
quality of public fi nances (f or a conceptual and empirical analysis of the quality 
of public fi nances in EU member states, see Barrios and Schaechter, 2008). Yet, 
redressing infl ation differentials and current-account imbalances crucially relies 
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upon market processes and qualities, comprising responsiveness to demand and 
supply shocks and effi cient resource allocation. The former refers to domestic 
product and labour market fl exibility. The latter relates inter alia to European 
market integration, in particular, fi nancial integration coupled with -rather un-
coupled from in practice- effective regulation and supervision of fi nancial mar-
kets and banks. There is a twofold question at this point: does the ECB have any, 
mostly auxiliary or indirect, role to play in those policy areas and, accordingly, 
how has it actually fared? 
As a matter of fact, communication on fi scal policy and structural reforms 
has evidently been a standard practice in central banking – although the lit-
erature has largely dealt with communication of monetary policy to fi nancial 
markets and the public (Blinder et al., 2008). That should cause no big surprise, 
once account is taken of the, often, positive thrust of central banks’ statements 
on fi scal and structural policy. Indeed, the stance of monetary policy is partially 
shaped by fi scal policy and market adjustability – and economic agents and the 
public need to be informed to that effect. However, the ECB’s communication on 
fi scal policy and structural reforms has been more frequent -and heavier- than 
that of the other major central banks; and, perhaps unsurprisingly, the ECB’s 
pronouncements on fi scal policy have largely been normative in nature – preach-
ing the benefi ts of cutting defi cits (Allard et al., 2012). 
Yet, the ECB has never contemplated the option of providing (monetary) 
stimulus for coordinating national governments’ policies to enrich the quality 
of public fi nances and implement structural reforms, thereby giving teeth to so-
called soft -and rather ineffectual- methods of coordination being then in place. 
More precisely, the ECB has never signaled any intentions to accommodate re-
forms, on the condition of their being credibly implemented; or, in today’s par-
lance, it has never committed itself to future reform-accommodative actions, in 
the way of state-contingent forward guidance (on the latter, see Samarina and 
Apokoritis, 2020). In fact, the ECB has explicitly ruled out such a case.11 Yet, in 
so doing it has ignored both economic theory and political economy thoroughly 
pointing to the contrary – and that, without prejudice to the objective of price 
stability (Koutsiaras, 2001). 
On the other hand, the ECB has been instrumental in fostering fi nancial 
integration, and with good reason. Financial fragmentation would preclude the 
convergence of prices of same-risk assets across euro area countries, thereby 
perpetuating the divergence in nominal interest rates for similar fi rms and, 
given infl ation differentials, exacerbating differences in real interest rates (Dar-
vas and Wolff, 2014). Not only would the transmission of monetary policy be 
impaired, but, much worse, asymmetries across euro area countries would be 
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growing further, thus making costlier the loss of (national) monetary autonomy 
and further driving apart business and infl ation cycles. On top of that, resource 
(especially capital) allocation across euro area countries would seriously be dis-
torted, thereby undermining convergence dynamics. 
Fostering fi nancial integration was, in principle, justifi ed and desirable. 
However, the ECB was overly optimistic that higher and deeper, yet poorly reg-
ulated, fi nancialisation would both provide for the effi cient allocation of capital 
across euro area countries and economic industries and allow for the monetary 
policy getting optimal and better transmitted. Underlying that optimism was 
the ECB’s -and many other central banks’- attesting to the effi cient market 
theory and subscribing to its policy implications. Hence, the risks of irrational 
exuberance and asset-price infl ation were practically discounted and the per-
ils of fi nancial dominance neglected (on the latter, see Dietsch et al., 2018, pp. 
63-71). Thus, one can partly explain why, as time went by, the ECB virtually 
turned a blind eye to money-growth trends when setting its policy rates,12 the 
formally advanced reasons notwithstanding. Furthermore, the ECB’s actual dis-
taste for a leaning-against-the-wind policy can accordingly be interpreted. This 
very argument might also go some way towards explaining why the ECB was, 
in the fi rst place, assigned a secondary role only in matters of fi nancial stability 
and prudential supervision of credit institutions. Besides, the ECB was eagerly 
promoting the cause of fi nancial markets’ self-regulation (Fontan, 2018, p. 166). 
In fact, the ECB threw its weight alongside the European Commission in 
pushing for the liberalisation and unifi cation of national repo markets, as a rem-
edy for fi nancial fragmentation. And, pursuant to that end, the ECB adapted its 
own collateral framework in accordance to -and in a sense complementing- the 
provisions of Directive 2002/47/EC on fi nancial collateral arrangements (for a 
detailed account, see Koutsiaras and Manouzas, 2016). That led to government 
bonds being treated as risk-free, regardless of national origin, in repo transac-
tions with the ECB, thereby encouraging investment in peripheral euro area 
bonds. As a result, the prices of peripheral euro area bonds increased and their 
yields went down; nominal interest rates across euro area countries converged, 
interbank lending expanded and euro area banks’ balance sheets grew exponen-
tially; besides, substantial capital fl ows took place from core euro area banks to 
peripheral economies. 
However, not only were such capital fl ows sizeable -and the balance sheets 
of banks oversized- but they were largely used in funding the peripheral econo-
mies’ non-tradable sectors, be they governments or construction industries. Thus, 
peripheral euro area countries were affl icted with the so-called Dutch disease, 
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whereby the equilibrium process described by the Balassa-Samuelson effect was 
virtually reversed (Koutsiaras and Manouzas, 2016). Private and/or public debt 
in peripheral countries reached unsustainable levels and economic and fi nancial 
imbalances, including asset-price bubbles and too-big (and interconnected)-to-fail 
banks, were built-up. In the words of D ietsch et al. (2018, p. 61), “[t]he combina-
tion of those factors set the Eurozone up for the perfect storm when the fi nancial 
crisis hit”, resulting inter alia in interbank lending being frozen and government 
bonds of peripheral countries being dumped – and their yields sharply increasing.
3. Turning unconventional: Meanings and labours, gains 
and losses
“I proposed an analogy, to associate the “standard” measures with the ethic of 
conviction and the “non-standard” measures with the ethic of responsibility. 
It is equally important to preserve integrity between intention and action, and 
between action and consequences. Our ‘separation principle’ proposes a way to 
preserve both.”
(Jean-Claude Trichet, 2011)
“The concept of “monetary policy transmission” is fundamental to the activities 
of a central bank, i.e. the process by which changes in the benchmark rate of 
interest of a central bank are transmitted through the fi nancial system to the 
real economy.”
(Mario Draghi, 2012)
T he period of so-called Great Moderation -and unhidden, but largely unappreciated global and European imbalances- came to an abrupt end. 
Mainstream macroeconomic theory was evidently found wanting. Thus, central 
banking had to fi nd its own way through a global credit crunch, huge fi nancial 
landslides and the greatest recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Sooner or later, monetary policymakers needed to improvise; but whether it was 
sooner rather than later did surely make a difference. Doubtless, the challenge 
for the ECB was even tougher. In Europe, the fi nancial crisis developed into an 
economic, political and institutional crisis when fi nancial investors betted on 
the creditworthiness -or lack thereof- of several euro area sovereigns, thereby 
threatening the integrity of the monetary union. And the ECB is the manager 
of a stateless currency. Monetary dominance in the euro area is realised over 
decentralised fi scal policies which are institutionally (cf. the Stability and 
Growth Pact) Ricardian in character, but often manage to escape the scripture.
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During the early phases of the crisis, the ECB’s monetary policy was guided 
by the so-called separation principle: interest rates were set in order to boost 
demand and bring the rapidly falling level of prices back to its (below but close to 
2%) objective; and provision of liquidity aimed at addressing severe tensions in 
the interbank and other short-term money markets. Thus, from October 2008 to 
May 2009 the ECB lowered its policy rate by 325 basis points (from 4.25% in July 
2008 to 1% in May 2009); it provided credit to (even creditworthy) banks which 
failed to secure funding in fi nancial markets at (market) rates close to zero from 
early 2009. Provision of liquidity was 
Initially realised via the main refi nancing operations (cf. fi xed-rate full al-
lotment policy); and following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, longer-term re-
fi nancing operations (LTROs) were also introduced – and later re-introduced. 
Most importantly, the collateral requirements were substantially eased (and/
or the range of eligible assets that could be pledged as collateral expanded). 
Furthermore, a covered bond purchase programme (CBPP) was implemented in 
July 2009 -and repeated twice, in 2011 and 2014- aiming at stabilising markets 
for those securities, thereby easing banks’ refi nancing problems. Thus, demand 
for liquidity on the part of sound credit institutions was virtually met in full, 
thereby allowing for the restoration of longer-term interbank lending commit-
ments (Honohan, 2019, pp. 90-91). 
It is true that the ECB was bold enough in those lending-of-last-resort ac-
tions, whilst the Bank of England and the Fed were initially hesitant and/or ef-
fectively constrained in their liquidity- management initiatives  ( Brunnermeier 
et al., 2016, p. 326). And, probably as a result, tensions in fi nancial markets 
eased and spreads -capturing risk differentials across maturities of interbank 
unsecured lending commitments- stabilised, albeit at levels higher than before 
the crisis (Praet et al., 2019, pp. 97-98). However, that can only go so far in pro-
claiming the glory of the ECB during the early phase of the crisis (as argued in 
 Brunnermeier et al., 2016, pp. 325-326). In fact, the Fed reduced its policy rate 
earlier than the ECB and in a more aggressive manner; from October 2007 to 
December 2008 the policy rate was reduced by 450 basis points (from 4.75 in 
September 2007 to 0,25% in December 2008). Also, in December 2008, the Fed 
launched its forward-guidance policy and asset-purchases programme, thereby 
embracing a much proactive approach. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the benefi cial effect of the ECB’s sup-
ply of liquidity was mostly related to the provision of dollars procured via swap 
operations with the Fed and channeled towards European banks struggling to 
refi nance their short-term unsecured dollar debt  (Mody and Nedeljkovic, 2018). 
What is more, whereas the ECB’s euro liquidity operations helped to allay dis-
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tress in fi nancial markets, they fell short of reviving the bank-lending activity 
– and economic activity at large. As a matter of fact, demand for loans remained 
weak, whilst banks were also not eager to supply, which is a typical manifesta-
tion of a (corporate and household) balance-sheet recession (the concept is ana-
lytically founded in Koo, 2011). Thus, seeking to maintain their profi tability, 
European banks used the ECB liquidity to embark on carry-trade operations. In 
the peripheral euro area countries, especially, banks used the ECB-supplied li-
quidity to buy their own government bonds, which paid a relatively high interest 
rate. Bond spreads were slightly reduced, but the banks-sovereign (lethal) nexus 
was at the same time deepened: not only were banks increasingly exposed to sov-
ereign risk, but sovereign default premia were also pushed up (Mody and Ned-
eljkovic, 2018). Such carry-trade operations on the part of European banks were 
unsurprisingly reinforced as new (very) long-term liquidity-provision measures 
were put into effect (Fontan, 2018, p. 175). 
By May 2010 sovereign bond markets in peripheral euro area countries were 
becoming increasingly distressed. Thus, in parallel to its lending-of-last-resort 
operations in support of the banking system, the ECB took up an investor-of-
last-resort role in virtually illiquid secondary sovereign-bond markets via its se-
curities markets programme (SMP), (the investor-of-last-resort concept is intro-
duced in Caballero et al., 2019). Henceforth, the (national) central banks of the 
Eurosystem were enabled to make large-scale purchases of sovereign bonds in 
secondary markets. Yet, the fact that the SMP was formally claimed to repair the 
monetary-policy transmission mechanism did little to appease those concerned 
about the programme’s legal, fi nancial and political-economic implications (for a 
description of the various channels through which the transmission mechanism 
was likely to be impaired, see González-Páramo, 2011). German central bankers, 
in particular, were seriously worried that the SMP was practically equivalent 
to (legally prohibited) monetary fi nancing and/or a transfer-union-through-the-
back-door device;13 and that, in general, it was prone to inducing moral haz-
ard (Honohan, 2019, p. 87). Such arguments were also raised regardless of the 
(stipulated) weekly sterilisation of the liquidity injected via SMP purchases, the 
sole purpose of which was to ensure the ECB’s commitment to price stability. 
Those very arguments were going to resurface forcefully when the investor-of-
last-resort actions of the ECB were advanced in size and scope. 
Infl ation nutters -alternatively hawks- would soon realise that they had 
very little, if any, reason to worry. Notwithstanding the transmission-mecha-
nism justifi cation of the SMP programme, the ECB was still holding fast to the 
separation principle. Thus, in April 2011, the policy rates were increased by 25 
basis points and, contrary to what could prudently be expected, a further 25 ba-
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sis points increase was introduced three months later. Perhaps, those inclined 
to side with the ECB, for intellectual, institutional or other reasons, would offer 
some justifi cation for the fi rst policy-rate increase. Infl ation was at that time 
likely to reach 3%, by virtue of potential second-round effects of a recent surge 
in energy prices. Nevertheless, economic recovery was very weak and, for a large 
part of the euro area, hardly in sight. Thus, one may probably refl ect that the 
April 2011 rate increase was rather premature (Honohan, 2019, pp. 91-92).14 The 
July 2011 increase, though, was totally incomprehensible. The fi nancial crisis in 
the periphery of the euro area was escalating, economic growth prospects were 
downgraded and fi scal consolidation was fully in force. The euro area was surely 
in need of monetary easing. Yet, the ECB’s diagnosis was that monetary policy 
was too accommodative; and that infl ation expectations had to be kept fi rmly 
anchored, thereby entailing an increase in policy rates (Mody, 2018, p. 296).15 
Mainstream monetary theorists would fi nd it almost inconceivable – and 
modern monetarist theorists simply beside the point; still, students of the politi-
cal economy of central banking would plausibly argue that the SMP initiative 
was traded for forestalling the slightest risk to price stability. The politics of the 
ECB’s monetary policy were thus made evident; for all its sophistication, fi nan-
cial and economic analysis, by itself, could seldom win the race. What is more, 
though, the ECB stepped into the politics of the euro area at large, whereby the 
interests of creditors were pitted against the interests of debtors, across and 
within euro area countries; and it clearly chose sides. 
Martin Sandbu, an economics leader writer for the Financial Times, has 
eloquently narrated the euro area’s self-infl icted damage. The latter was caused 
by universal fi scal austerity, ill-advised monetary policy and zombie banks exac-
erbating the credit crunch. And it resulted in a double-dip recession (2011-2013) 
and an exit from the single currency -and the threat coming thereof- being no-
longer incredible (Sandbu, 2015, pp. 106-138). As Sandbu bluntly writes, “[a]t 
the root of all this lies the refusal to accept that debts that cannot be paid, will 
not, and it is worse to pretend they will -even from the point of view of collect-
ing as much as can be had- than it is to try to manage their restructuring in an 
orderly manner. From that error fl awed the colossal mistakes that the eurozone 
would go on to make, ranging from Greece and Ireland early on to the damaging 
stand-off with Greece in the spring of 2015” (p. 137).
Since the beginning of the euro area crisis, the ECB was adamant that 
debts, be they government or private, should be fully honoured. Regardless of 
authoritative academic opinion and International Monetary Fund (IMF) advice, 
Jean-Claude Trichet, at that time president of the ECB, was fi ercely opposing 
the idea of a partial default on Greek debt in order to make the Greek economic 
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adjustment programme sustainable and socially less costly. And he persistently 
demanded that the Irish banks’ solvency be restored with taxpayers’ money, in-
stead of asking creditors (bondholders) to bear losses. Part of the explanation 
is surely ideational: the ECB wanted to uphold (policy and institutional) cred-
ibility, safeguard investors’ confi dence and avert moral hazard. The ECB was 
almost fully in principle, and quite often in practice, aligned with German policy 
preferences – but that was about to change to some extent as the time went 
by. Interestingly though, Jean-Claude Trichet did his best to kill off a plan for 
“orderly insolvency” sponsored by German Chancellor Merkel and French Presi-
dent Sarkozy (the so-called Deauville agreement, October 18th, 2010). At the 
same time, he championed the idea of automatic sanctions being imposed on fi s-
cal sinners, although the German government had already abandoned its earlier 
demands to that effect (Mody, 2018, pp. 273-276).16 
What was primarily at issue was the ECB’s concern to preserve the stabil-
ity of mostly French and German banks at that time exposed to Greek sovereign 
bonds; and, generally, to alleviate the losses incurred by private fi nancial insti-
tutions exposed to risky assets – alas, via socialising such losses. At issue was 
also the ECB’s aversion to the risk of its balance-sheet incurring losses, thereby 
putting its independence at risk too (on the subject of a central bank’s loss of 
capital and the fi nancial, economic and policy implications, with emphasis to 
the Eurosystem, see Buiter, 2008). The ECB’s worries about the health of its 
balance sheet were mostly incited by its SMP purchases rather than its open 
market operations.17
Thus, it may cause little surprise that the ECB kept on opposing the re-
structuring of Greek government debt, regardless of the euro area governments’ 
unanimously agreeing, in May 2011, on the partial write-down of Greek sover-
eign debt. Private sector involvement (PSI) -as was euphemistically called- en-
tailing the voluntary, in name, participation of private sector creditors, was part 
and parcel of a second rescue programme; and it was only agreed upon when 
it became evident that the Greek government could no longer service its debt. 
However, Jean-Claude Trichet threatened that the ECB would stop accepting 
Greek bonds as collateral in the central bank’s open market operations. It took 
time to specify the details of the Greek PSI and, fi nally, in March 2012, it was 
decided that the face value of bonds held by private creditors (in total, 200 billion 
euros amounting at that time to 60% of the Greek sovereign debt) were to be cut 
by half. Meanwhile, the 
ECB had given its assent, but only after it was made whole via a separate 
debt exchange exclusively held for the central bank – a choice that would later 
prove unwise (Sandbu, 2015, pp. 140-144). 
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Collateral policy and, especially, conditionality were the main means em-
ployed by the ECB in order to ensure that its liquidity-providing (last-resort) in-
terventions would reinforce -rather than weaken- governments’ policies to lower 
default risk. Yet, they were also the means for the ECB’s blurring the boundaries 
between monetary and fi scal policy and even posing a challenge to (national) 
democratic politics. Thus, the eligibility of Greek bonds -issued or fully guar-
anteed by the Greek government- used as collateral in the ECB’s refi nancing 
operations was made conditional on the government’s implementing fi scal aus-
terity and structural reforms, in exchange for a rescue loan and the purchasing 
of Greek government bonds on the part of the ECB (cf. SMP). To put it precisely, 
a waiver of minimum credit requirements for Greek bonds was put into effect in 
April 2010, lifted in February 2015, following the newly elected leftwing govern-
ment’s rift with its creditors over the pace and the size of fi scal austerity meas-
ures, and reinstated in June 2016, following the government’s capitulation.18 
As a matter of fact, the ECB’s conditionality policy -and politics- took differ-
ent forms. Firstly, being a member of the Troika supervising the implementa-
tion of the economic adjustment programmes for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Cyprus, the ECB put itself into an awkward position, at least to the informed 
observer’s eyes. It both provided liquidity support and took part in assessing the 
conformity of governments’ fi scal and structural reforms to the prescribed bench-
marks, thereby also authorising the disbursement of rescue loans. The legality 
and legitimacy of the ECB’s role in the Troika were questioned (Fontan, 2018, p. 
171), yet the Troika would survive such challenges. 
Secondly, conditionality was applied unoffi cially -and intensely for that mat-
ter- via the SMP operations. The governments of Portugal (prior to its May 2011 
economic adjustment programme), Italy and Spain (with no programmes) were 
evidently pressed hard to put fi scal and structural reforms in place. Letters were 
sent to that effect by the ECB to the governments, the pressure being severe 
on the government of Italy. Ιt took the form of making Italian sovereign bond 
purchases strictly conditional on the implementation of reforms, regardless of 
the alarming increase in yield spreads on Italian sovereign bonds. Yet, the ECB 
made vast purchases of Italian sovereign bonds only after the recalcitrant prime 
minister Silvio Berlusconi resigned – so much for the unintended consequences of 
the ECB’s actions (Bru nnermeier et al., 2016, pp. 334-336; Fontan, 2018, p. 172).
Perhaps, from a technical point of view, emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) 
could -indeed, should- only carry little political weight. ELA is provided at the 
discretion of national central banks to credit institutions pledging collateral that 
fails to meet the eligibility requirements in open market operations; and provi-
sion of ELA often comes at a high rate of interest. What is more, ELA implies no 
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risk-sharing. Risk is solely undertaken by national central banks -and potential 
losses are accordingly borne- whereas in open market operations risk is inher-
ently shared across the Eurosystem – and potential losses are thus mutualised. 
Nevertheless, the ECB’s Governing Council can veto, with a two-thirds majority, 
a national central bank’s provisioning of ELA. That was initially justifi ed on the 
grounds of maintaining a well-functioning transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. Following the establishment of the single supervisory mechanism (SSM), 
the Governing Council’s role could also be directly justifi ed on the grounds of 
upholding the criterion of solvency of banks receiving liquidity assistance.
The ECB’s Governing Council made use of its veto power in the cases of Ire-
land (November 2010), Cyprus (March 2013) and Greece (July 2015). Yet, in all 
three cases technical justifi cation was in short supply – to say the least, it was 
contradictory. The Irish government was threatened that ELA would no longer 
be available, unless plans for a policy of “burning the bondholders” were totally 
abandoned and, what is more, an economic adjustment programme for Ireland 
was promptly negotiated and, then, fully implemented. Legitimate or not, the 
ECB’s concerns for its balance sheet were clearly far-fetched; what mattered 
most was capital adequacy of European private banks exposed to Irish banks’ 
debt (Sandbu, 2015, p. 100). Yet, dictating policy to the government -the letter 
sent by Jean-Claude Trichet to Finance Minister Brian Lenihan was testament 
to that purpose- went far beyond the ECB’s mandate (Honohan, 2019, p. 245). 
Whereas in Ireland the ECB’s threat aimed at forcing the government to bail 
out banks, in the case of Cyprus the ELA weapon was used in order to force the 
government to bail in creditors and restructure Cypriot banks – and only on that 
condition could an economic adjustment programme be concluded. Indeed, this 
was a “stunning trajectory” for the ECB (Sandbu, 2015, p. 151). It was shocking, 
though, that the ECB -along with the IMF and the European Commission- ap-
proved, by way of concession to the Cypriot government, that resolution and re-
structuring of the two Cypriot banks be virtually put aside and that, instead, a 
one-off levy be charged, albeit differentiated, on both big and small deposits. In 
doing so, the ECB acquiesced in a choice that would in all likelihood dent the cred-
ibility of deposit insurance across the euro area, technical excuses notwithstand-
ing (p. 152). The plan was rejected by the Cypriot parliament and a new plan, 
going in the right direction, was fi nally put in place – but that is beside the point. 
The ECB’s use of ELA in Greece was different in form; and it was profoundly 
political. The ECB, at that time headed by Mario Draghi,19 did not cut off banks’ 
access to ELA, nor did it lower the amount of emergency liquidity potentially 
provided by the Bank of Greece. Yet, it refused to increase the amount of ELA, 
which at that time stood at 90 billion euros, following the newly elected Greek 
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government’s announcement, in June 2015, of a referendum on the terms of a 
third adjustment programme. The ECB did so regardless of massive deposit 
withdrawals from Greek banks – whilst in May 2012, when withdrawals were 
lower, the amount of Greek ELA had reached 125 billion euros. However, such 
a decision was hard to justify. In October 2014, the ECB, acting in its new ca-
pacity as bank supervisor, had considered Greek banks to be solvent. On the 
other hand, had the ECB now reasons to reconsider that verdict -for example, 
because the banks-government nexus was getting deeper and, especially, more 
worrisome-20 it should have called for resolution of insolvent banks and restruc-
turing of the banking system (Koutsiaras and Manouzas, 2016). Yet, the ECB 
shied away from that dilemma. It virtually had no other purpose than forcing 
the government to agree on the terms of a third adjustment programme. In July 
2015, the government gave in to the demands of its creditors, alas overring the 
outcome of the referendum – but, again, that is beside the point. 
Back in November 2011, while the euro area’s self-infl icted damage was 
unfolding, Mario Draghi succeeded Jean-Claude Trichet to the presidency of 
the ECB.21 A revision of monetary policy was largely justifi ed, at least on the 
grounds of empirical evidence and other central banks’ successful practice; and 
on political grounds too. Thus, the interest rate increases of April and July 2011 
were reversed, by cutting policy rates by a total of 50 basis points in November 
and December 2011. Furthermore, in December 2011 and February 2012, two 
very long-term refi nancing operations (VLTROs), with a maturity of three years 
and the option of early repayment, were conducted, grossly amounting to 1 tril-
lion euros. Funding constraints were thus relaxed for banks, but that did not 
-and could not- have substantial effects on the non-fi nancial sector’s activity. 
Besides, in the absence of conditionality, banks could use the ECB’s money just 
to repair their balance sheets, potentially transferring risk to the balance sheet 
of the central bank, as well as engage in carry-trade. Last, the range of eligible 
collateral was further expanded and the minimum reserve ratio reduced. 
Safe prediction: Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech and his an-
nouncement in September 2012 of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
“emergency facility” will always fi nd a place in fi nancial historians’ narratives of 
European money. OMT did not literally constitute an open-ended commitment 
on the part of the ECB; no lender-of-last-resort-to-governments role was thereby 
assumed by the central bank. Only shortly maturing -up to three years- sovereign 
bonds of crisis countries could be purchased in the secondary market, provided 
the country in question had access to private funding or embarked on an eco-
nomic adjustment programme sponsored by the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) – and, for that matter, unanimously agreed. Formally, OMT was justifi ed 
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on the grounds of enhancing transmission of the stance of monetary policy. And 
it was made explicit that potential risks to price stability would be taken care 
of. Thus, amongst others, the liquidity created via OMT would be fully sterilised 
(ECB, 2012; for a skeptical view about the impact of OMT sterilisation, in itself, 
on infl ation, see McMahon et al., 2012). 
For all the ECB’s promise to deploy its balance sheet heavily, the separation 
principle was not eliminated (for a different view, albeit qualifi ed, see Rostagno 
et al. 2019, p. 15); and revision of monetary policy was still devoid of vigour. Part 
of the reason might be hostility to OMT on the part of the Bundesbank’s presi-
dent Jens Weidmann; his testimony to the German constitutional court, which 
was asked by a group of professors to rule OMT illegal, provided solid evidence 
to that effect.22 Perhaps, slowing down the pace of cutting policy rates -from De-
cember 2011 to November 2013, the main policy rate was cut by 75 basis points 
in total- was an attempt to assuage Bundesbank’s (falsely prompted) fears of 
infl ation expectations being de-anchored.
This argument is mostly political rather than technical in nature. The other 
German member of the ECB’s Governing Council (and former advisor of Wolf-
gang Schäuble), Jörg Asmussen, was one of President Draghi’s allies in pushing 
for OMT. And he had the German government’s backing to that effect. Granted, 
the German government had fi rmly endorsed Mario Draghi’s initiative implied 
in his “whatever it takes” speech – subject, of course, to strict conditions being 
applied therein (B runnermeier et al., 2016, pp. 354-337, p. 355; also, Sandbu, 
2015, p. 160). The German government’s support to the OMT programme was 
obviously endogenous to two major institutional reforms pursued at the same 
time; namely, the establishment of ESM in October 2012 and the decision by 
euro area governments in June 2012 to put SSM in place, in order to break the 
nexus between sovereigns and banks.23,24
It is widely believed that OMT was perceived as a credible ECB commitment – 
a credible threat to rentiers, if you wish. As a result, bond markets calmed and pan-
ic was arrested. However, OMT did not provide any stimulus to the euro area econ-
omy; sliding into another recession was at that time pointed to in macroeconomic 
forecasts (Tooze, 2018, pp. 442-443; Honohan, 2019, p. 94). Revision of monetary 
policy and, for that matter, abandoning the separation principle and making active 
use of the ECB’s balance sheet could no longer be postponed. Besides, the ECB 
was confronted with three contingencies: receding excess liquidity and exchange-
rate movements had effectively tightened the stance of monetary policy; the lat-
ter’s transmission through the banking channel had evidently been impaired; and 
disinfl ation had been entrenched in the euro area economy, because of a weakening 
aggregate demand and lower infl ation expectations (Rostagno et al. 2019, p. 17). 
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What is probably more, monetary policy was the only stabilisation instru-
ment on offer. Although the ECB’s main policy rate had virtually reached the 
zero-lower bound -by November 2013 the interest rate on the ECB’s main refi -
nancing operations had been cut to 0.25%- fi scal stabilisation in the euro area 
was politically and institutionally restrained; and that will hardly change sub-
stantially in the foreseeable future. Yet, mainstream macroeconomic theory -in 
the form of workhorse New Keynesian models of the business cycle- and analysis 
show that, when an economy enters a liquidity trap, fi scal policy aiming at di-
rectly stimulating demand will in all likelihood be effective (for example, Egg-
ertsson, 2009; DeLong and Summers, 2012). 
Following the experience of a number of smaller countries’ central banks 
outside the euro (Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland), the ECB introduced in June 
2014 a negative interest rate of -0,10% on its deposit facility. Henceforth the 
rate on the deposit facility would effectively become the ECB’s main policy rate 
– the rate on its main refi nancing operations having been lowered to 0.05% in 
September 2014 and 0.00% in March 2016. A series of 10 basis points cuts were 
subsequently introduced -in September 2014, December 2015, March 2016 and 
September 2019- bringing the rate on deposit facility to -0.50%. Designed to dis-
suade households and businesses from saving, thereby making borrowing and 
spending on consumption and investment more attractive, negative rates are 
nonetheless controversial. 
Obviously, the effectiveness of negative rates in stimulating demand de-
pends much upon the response of banks, whether that be related to lowering 
rates on the deposits of households and fi rms, or lending; and it also depends 
on the response of savers and borrowers to banks’ interest-rate policies (for an 
optimistic view, see Alatavilla et al., 2019). Yet, the transmission of the ECB’s 
negative rates, especially their effect on the lending policies of banks and busi-
ness investment, may differ across banks, depending upon their funding base 
-that is, upon their relative reliance on deposits or market funding- and on their 
taking of risk in lending or investing in securities issued by the private sector 
(Heider et al. 2019). And the same may go a long way towards putting the issue 
of bank profi tability in perspective.25 
How far can the negative-policy-rates policy go? Kenneth Rogoff (2016) has 
eloquently argued the case for making negative rates “central banking business 
as usual” (p. 127), while fully acknowledging the legal, institutional, political 
economy and even moral questions pertaining to phasing out paper currency. 
Indeed, paper currency is the major obstacle to introducing negative rates on 
a large scale; there is virtually no impediment to charging negative rates on 
electronic currency (p. 5-6). Yet, regardless of the impressive technological devel-
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opments (from credit and debit cards to blockchain technology) allowing for an 
ever-expanding use of electronic money, love for cash remains strong. As a mat-
ter of fact, 79% of all transactions by euro area consumers in 2016 were made in 
cash, such a preference being stronger in southern euro area countries, as well as 
in Germany, Austria and Slovenia (Es selink and Hernández, 2017). Yet, demand 
for cash is very likely to be endogenous to a central bank’s policy rates (Shirai 
and Sugandi, 2019). 
The limits to the ECB’s policy of negative interest rates are virtually set 
at the level of a “political lower bound”. In other words, they are determined by 
the implications of negative rates for income redistribution across and within 
euro area countries, redistributive cleavages being shaped by fi nancial, insti-
tutional and demographic factors. Hence, savers are pitted against borrowers, 
deposits-funded banks against market-funded credit institutions and young or 
even middle-aged households against elderly ones. Therefore, it causes little sur-
prise that opposition to the ECB’s policy of negative interest rates was so furious 
in Germany. The media made use of the (German) term “Strafzins” or “punish-
ment rates” to refer to below-zero interest rates; Bild portrayed Mario Draghi 
as “Count Draghila”, a vampire sucking dry the deposit accounts of savers. And 
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble went so far as to say that the effects of the 
ECB’s monetary policy were fuelling German Euroscepticism, thereby boosting 
the popularity of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) so party.26 
Forward guidance (FwG) was effectively introduced in July 2013, aiming to 
anchor infl ation expectations and preserve an accommodative level of long-term 
interest rates in the face of tensions in global bond markets and a still timid euro 
area recovery (Hartmann and Smets, 2018, p. 36). FwG was also intended to 
inform market agents and the public at large about the ECB’s reaction function 
(Praet, 2013), thereby implying the central bank’s commitment to bring infl ation 
(lower but) close to 2%. FwG has subsequently evolved and a framework for that 
policy has formally been defi ned. Thus, FwG took up a time and state-contingent 
form and even linked guidance on policy rates to that on the ECB’s net asset 
purchases (about which more later), thereby allowing for policy interactions to 
be realised and enabling coordination of investor expectations in asset markets 
(Rostagno et al., 2019, p. 18). Adjustments to FwG were later made in order to 
take account of changes in other monetary policy instruments. 
Rationalisating FwG has given monetary theorists a hard time. A “forward 
guidance puzzle” has thus emerged: standard New Keynesian models predict 
that a credible FwG commitment to keep policy rates low for a long time has an 
immediate effect on output and infl ation, although such a prediction is evidently 
unrealistic – and theoretically challenged too (Eberly and Woodford, 2020, esp. 
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pp. 233-234). Alan Blinder (2018) has bluntly argued that there is nothing rea-
sonable in our belief that FwG works in practice, that is, in the belief that central 
banks can infl uence long-term interest rates by infl uencing expectations of future 
short-term rates. Such a belief is conceptually relied on the rational expectations 
theory which is no less than an “abysmal empirical failure” (p. 568). Indeed, 
the effectiveness of FwG is theoretically doubted in models featuring bounded 
rationality and heterogenous agents (Farhi and Werning, 2019). Importantly, 
Blinder (2018) has also argued that FwG is about prediction, not commitment, 
the main purpose of a central bank’s communication about monetary policy be-
ing to “infl uence market expectations by forecasting its own behaviour” (p. 569). 
Obviously then, the effectiveness of FwG, however little, depends a lot upon the 
quality of a central bank’s macroeconomic forecasts. Alas, ECB forecasts in the 
years 2013-2018 have been found to be systematically incorrect, thereby render-
ing the central bank’s FwG inadequate and prompting market participants to 
ignore it (Darvas, 2018). 
Using the ECB’s balance sheet as a monetary policy instrument came to be 
considered inevitable. The easing of policy rates -from September 2011 to June 
2014 the rate on the main refi nancing operations was cut by 125 basis points- 
had little effect on economic activity in weak euro area countries and the outlook 
for infl ation had worsened (Hartmann and Smets, 2018, p. 34). Credit growth 
was still negative, largely refl ecting continuing private sector deleveraging. 
Banks, in particular, were making use of the early repayment option they were 
afforded in VLTROs to pay back a large amount of liquidity they had borrowed 
in times of liquidity shortages; and the ECB’s balance sheet was consequently 
receding, but for no good reason from a macroeconomic point of view (Praet et 
al., 2019, p. 104). 
Thus, in June 2014 the ECB introduced targeted longer-term refi nancing 
operations (TLTROs) with a four-year maturity. Lending of last resort to credit 
institutions would now be made conditional on the latter’s use of borrowed li-
quidity. That is, banks had to lend the borrowed liquidity to non-fi nancial fi rms 
and households and if they failed to do so, they would have to pay back idle li-
quidity before the maturity date of the relevant TLTRO;27 moreover, they could 
no longer take part in further longer-term refi nancing operations (Fontan, 2018, 
pp. 176-177). However, reluctance on the part of banks to borrow on such condi-
tions led the ECB to soften sticks and strengthen carrots – to relax conditional-
ity and enhance incentives. Thus, in March 2016 a second TLTRO programme 
was introduced whereby banks were no longer required to repay the liquidity 
they had borrowed prior to its maturity date, whilst borrowing rates were linked 
to the participating banks’ amount of lending (with the exception of lending to 
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households for house purchases); borrowing rates could even be as low as the in-
terest rate on the deposit facility. The latter provision was made more attractive 
in the third TLTRO programme which was introduced in March 2019; namely, 
borrowing rates could now be as low as the average interest rate on the deposit 
facility prevailing over the life of TLTRO.28
Using the ECB’s balance sheet became at last the main monetary policy 
instrument. This entailed both increases in size and changes in the composi-
tion of the central bank’s balance sheet (on the asset side); to that effect, the 
ECB played (nearly) in full the role of an investor of last resort. In September 
2014 an asset-backed security programme and a third covered bond purchase 
programme were introduced. Yet, the biggest -and most controversial- part of 
the ECB’s asset purchase programme (APP) was announced in January 2015, 
amidst persistent defl ationary pressures and long-term infl ation expectations 
trending quite lower than 2% (Brunnermeier et al., 2016, pp. 360-361); and a cor-
porate sector purchase programme (CSPP) and, far more importantly, a public 
sector purchase programme (PSPP) were to start in March 2015. The ECB was 
thereby taking not so much a brave -the other major central banks having been 
there before- as a bold step toward the age of quantitative easing (QE). What 
was bold, however, might have been braver had it been prompter; and, perhaps, 
bravery would also have been more rewarding. 
Thus, during the 2015-2018 period, monthly purchases averaged: 60 billion 
euros from March 2015 to March 2016; 80 billion euros from April 2016 to March 
2017; 60 billion euros from April 2017 to December 2017; 30 billion euros from 
January 2018 to September 2018; and 15 billion euros from October 2018 to De-
cember 2018. Furthermore, between January 2019 and October 2019 the ECB 
fully reinvested the principal payments from maturing securities, in order to 
maintain the cumulative net purchases at the level obtained in December 2018. 
In September 2019 the ECB Governing Council decided that APP purchases be 
restarted in November 2019 and end only shortly before it starts raising the 
policy rates; and reinvesting the principal payments from maturing securities be 
fully continued for “as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity condi-
tions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation”, that is, “for an extended 
period of time past the date on which the Governing Council begins to raise the 
key ECB interest rates”. At the end of January 2020 Eurosystem holdings under 
the APP amounted to about 2.600 billion euros in total, of which about 2.115 bil-
lion euros were accounted for by holdings accumulated under the PSPP.29 
No wonder the ECB’s QE -its PSPP dimension, in particular- was political-
ly controversial and economically doubtful. A great deal of criticism came from 
the German side and focused on familiar concerns; the boundaries separating 
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monetary and fi scal policy would effectively be blurred and a transfer union, 
mostly in the form of a Eurobond, would be introduced through the backdoor. In 
response to such criticisms, and by way of concession to German demands, ECB 
purchases were to be made in proportion to the capital contributed to the ECB by 
each national central bank and a limit of 33% was placed on the share of a coun-
try’s outstanding debt held by the Eurosystem.30 What is more, national central 
banks were to make 80% of bond purchases and take on their own balance sheets 
the sovereign risk implied; risk sharing was thus limited to 20%. 
However, such arrangements revealed a paradox inherent in the ECB’s QE; 
namely, bond purchases were to be made regardless of the size of sovereign debt 
markets, their allocation being instead determined by the size of the economy 
and the population of the euro area member states.31 Those arrangements also 
implied that the pace of QE would inevitably be slowed down -actually it did- 
because of bond purchases reaching their 33% limit. And they also refl ected a 
fundamental fl aw built into the Eurosystem, as argued by Willem Buiter (2019). 
In spite of their holding signifi cant amounts of assets at their own risk, national 
central banks have almost no control over their issuance of central bank money 
-this is decided by the ECB Governing Council- thereby running the risk to go 
bankrupt. In this sense, all euro-denominated assets held by national central 
banks are effectively foreign-currency-denominated assets (p.4). 
Mainstream monetary theory, in the form of general equilibrium models 
with representative agents, had virtually offered no support to QE. This (pes-
simistic) view of QE has recently been questioned in models with heterogenous 
households – economically unequal households holding assets with different li-
quidity properties (for a discussion, see Cui and Sterk, 2018). Yet, theoretical 
ambivalence may partly explain why the effects of QE are still poorly understood, 
let alone safely predicted. Robert Skidelsky (2018) has rightly argued that, in ef-
fect, central banks had to take a chance with the (long rebutted) Fischer-Fried-
man version of monetarism -at that time embraced by the Fed chairman Ben 
Bernanke- thereby turning themselves into quantity theorists of sorts (p. 256). 
QE was meant to work through various channels; namely, the portfolio 
rebalancing channel, inducing holders of sovereign bonds to switch to equities 
and corporate bonds, thus encouraging fi rms to raise funds in capital markets; 
the bank lending channel, offsetting the vast increase in liquidity preference of 
banks, fi rms and households; the exchange rate channel, entailing an increase 
in the demand for foreign assets, a fall in the euro exchange rate and an increase 
in exports; and the signaling channel, revealing the central bank’s commitment 
to refl ation, thereby allowing for the long-term infl ation expectations to be re-
anchored (Brunne rmeier et al., 2016, p. 362-363; Skidelsky, 2018, pp. 263-268). 
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Yet, the scope and the effectiveness of QE were empirically challenged. Grant-
ed, critical arguments were deployed in the deliberations of the ECB Governing 
Council – and in political debates too. Defl ation, to start with, was said to pose no 
threat to economic growth; historical evidence has made clear that defl ation may 
often refl ect improvements in productivity and cause no harm to consumption 
expenditure and aggregate demand (Bordo et al., 2004). Furthermore, experience 
with QE, in both the US and Japan, was thought to have made evident that not 
all QE operations were equally successful, nor were all channels of transmis-
sion equally powerful. Thus, in the US purchases of mortgage-backed securities 
helped the balance-sheet debilitated housing sector to recover, whilst purchases 
of government bonds had no obvious success; and in Japan implementation of QE 
in 2013 led to large movements in the stock market and the exchange rate, im-
plying that the exchange rate channel was the most powerful one (Brunnermeier 
et al., 2016, p. 364). Admittedly, the more QE works through the exchange rate 
channel, the less palatable are its repercussions for the world’s political economy. 
Furthermore, it was maintained that portfolio rebalancing may result in 
the formation of asset price bubbles. It was also argued that, by reducing fund-
ing costs and allowing for lower interest rates on bank loans, QE may facilitate 
the emergence of so-called “zombie companies”, thereby causing deceleration in 
productivity growth, albeit indirectly (for a discussion of the negative realloca-
tion effects of easier credit constraints, see Aghion et al., 2019). Finally, from a 
wholly different point of view, it was alleged that QE has a “substitution effect”, 
namely that it discourages alternative policy strategies with less inegalitar-
ian effects, such as “helicopter money” or fi scal stabilisation (Fontan, 2018, pp. 
176-177) – but this is a far-fetched allegation so far as the euro area’s political 
economy is concerned. 
Assessing the effects of the ECB’s QE is a daunting task. It is an exercise 
in counterfactual reasoning, thus being fraught with (huge) uncertainty about 
paths that would have been taken, had QE been implemented in a different 
way or/and earlier – or simply in its absence. Likewise, disentangling the im-
pact of QE from that of the other, yet in parallel pursued, ECB’s (non-standard) 
policies is hard to attain. Nevertheless, there is a widespread belief that mon-
etary easing -and QE in particular- was less successful in the euro area than 
in the US and the UK. In the US coordination of fi scal and monetary policy 
provided for more stimulus being injected, whereas in the UK the stimulus 
from monetary policy was bigger than in the euro area (Skidelsky, 2018, pp. 
273-274). One may plausibly speculate that had the ECB’s monetary policy 
been less hesitantly activated, the euro area would probably have escaped, 
perhaps in part, the ills of double-dip recession, stubbornly low infl ation and 
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lower drifting long-term infl ation expectations, subdued investment and de-
clining Wicksellian (natural) interest rates and weak GDP growth prospects. 
That echoes Paul Krugman’s diagnosis of the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) failure, 
in 2014, to stimulate aggregate demand and bring about a sustained increase 
in infl ation; namely that the BoJ had lost credibility having being stuck in a 
“timidity trap” (cited in Mody, 2018, pp. 382-383). 
What is maybe more important, the effects of the ECB’s QE have not been dis-
tributionally neutral. Asset owners have clearly benefi tted and, given that wealth 
tends to be concentrated in richer households, a further increase in the concentra-
tion of private wealth has in all likelihood occurred (Fontan, 2018, p. 176). Further-
more, it is maintained that savers holding interest-bearing assets have suffered 
an income loss, whilst net-borrowing younger households have enjoyed increases 
in their purchasing power (Dobbs et al., 2013). On the other hand, research by a 
group of ECB economists has focused on the impact of monetary policy on wages 
and income, while accounting for differences amongst households in employment 
and ownership of liquid assets; their fi ndings point to favourable income effects 
for households holding few or no liquid assets, implying a reduction in inequality 
(Ampudia et al., 2018). However, evaluating the impact of non-standard monetary 
policy on fi nancial variables, such as stock market prices, bond yields and interest 
rates, is relatively straightforward, whereas assessing its effects on real economic 
variables -which is much more important- depends a lot upon counterfactual rea-
soning, thus being controversial (Skidelsky, 2018, p. 263). 
Of course, the distributional effects of the ECB’s monetary policy have a bear-
ing on the bigger questions of the central bank’s independence and accountabil-
ity. Granting independence to central banks was premised on the distributional 
neutrality of monetary policy (Tucker, 2018). Politically neutral central banks 
could solely focus on safeguarding price stability (and, in broader terms, provid-
ing for macroeconomic stabilisation) by making uncompromised use of their tech-
nocratic expertise. Transparency and accountability -or, in a narrowly technical 
form, accountability as transparency- were among other meant to enhance the 
legitimacy of central banks. However, one may fairly suggest that central banks, 
the ECB being virtually on the forefront, have increasingly been accountable to 
those people who are able to fully grasp the highly technical issues pertaining to 
monetary policy, or are well aware of their practical implications, that is, to large-
scale asset owners and, by way of aggregation, the fi nancial sector (for a theoreti-
cal treatment of central bank accountability along these lines, see Best, 2016). 
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4. Back to the drawing board
“If central bankers are the only game in town, I’m getting out of town!”
(Mervyn King, 2013)32
“But monetary policy does not exist in a vacuum. The situation of central banks 
is better described as independence in interdependence, since other policies 
matter a great deal. They can buttress or dilute the effects of our policy. They 
can slow down or speed up the return to stability. And they can determine 
whether stability is accompanied by prosperity…”
(Mario Draghi, 2016)
“[M]onetary policy cannot, and should not, be the only game in town. The longer 
our accommodative measures remain in place, the greater the risk that side 
effects will become more pronounced… Other policy areas –notably fi scal and 
structural polices– also have to play their part… Indeed, when interest rates are 
low, fi scal policy can be highly effective… We also have to gear up on climate 
change… Like digitalization, climate change affects the context in which central 
banks operate…” 
(Lagarde, 2020)
T  he ECB could hardly afford political neutrality, even in the monetary union’s “honeymoon phase”. Being a stateless central bank entailed striking 
compromises between confl icting (national) monetary policy preferences. 
However, such compromises would often be reached at the expense of theoretical 
consistency and to the detriment of coherence in the ECB’s monetary policy 
strategy. And, perhaps inevitably, they would also bear the mark of the dominant 
partner in the European Monetary System, that is prior to the establishment 
of the monetary union (Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989), now also being the 
biggest subscriber to the ECB’s capital. Political neutrality and, for that matter, 
monetary activism on the part of the ECB -as well as liquidity in the euro-area- 
were largely inadequate during the euro area crisis, especially in its early phase. 
They were subsequently increased, but at a slow pace and in a preferential 
fashion, that is, largely to the benefi t of the banking industry. Eventually, the 
ECB did try to make a virtue of necessity; yet, this could only go so far. Thus, 
the ECB has reluctantly become the only game in town, its reluctance being 
mostly associated with the overriding concerns of certain national central banks 
of the Eurosystem, most notably the Bundesbank; namely, ensuring monetary 
dominance, averting (at that time illusory) infl ationary dangers, preventing 
moral hazard, enforcing structural reforms and, not least, fending off any, 
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indirectly emerging, type of transfer union. Therefore, the ECB could have no 
great ambitions; its lonely game was unlikely to produce a medal-winning policy 
maker in the world championship of central banking.
In November 2019 Christine Lagarde succeeded Mario Draghi to the presi-
dency of the ECB.33 In January 2020 the ECB’s Governing Council launched a 
review of the central bank’s monetary policy strategy, encompassing the quan-
titative defi nition of price stability, the ECB’s monetary policy, the analytical 
framework and the central bank’s communication practices. Other issues will 
also be considered, such as fi nancial stability, employment and climate change.34 
No doubt, the quantitative formulation of price stability is of the utmost impor-
tance. But it is also surrounded by theoretical controversies regarding: a. specifi -
cation of the target – nominal GDP (Hughhes Hallet et al., 2015), the price level, 
infl ation, Taylor rule; b. symmetry of the target – downward and/or upward; c. 
fl exibility of the target – for example, fl exible infl ation averaging (Mertens and 
Williams, 2019); d. the numerical value of the target, especially in the case of 
infl ation targeting (a higher infl ation target at around 4% is advocated in Blan-
chard et al., 2010). Taking into account infl ation differentials amongst the euro 
area economies is an equally important element of the ECB’s monetary regime 
– and should accordingly be dealt with in the upcoming deliberations. 
In principle, a higher infl ation target and/or a more fl exible regime, includ-
ing specifi cation of an inherently fl exible target, allow for the ECB’s monetary 
policy providing more support to the fulfi llment of other (general) economic policy 
objectives, primarily (full) employment. Yet, there is no absence of trade-offs and 
policy dilemmas. For example, safeguarding fi nancial stability may, sometimes, 
imply the need for a less accommodative monetary policy stance than otherwise 
justifi ed, implementation of macroprudential measures notwithstanding. Fur-
thermore, “greening” the ECB’s monetary policy, for example by tilting the Euro-
system’s assets and collateral towards low-carbon industries and fi rms (as sug-
gested in Schoenmaker, 2019), may be associated with substantial side-effects 
of an allocative and redistributive nature, regardless of the potential (maybe 
positive) overall impact of a “green” monetary policy on productivity and growth; 
concerns relating to the ECB’s independence and accountability may thus arise. 
Questions about the conduct of monetary policy, and normative theoreti-
cal controversies for that matter, are founded on analytical grounds. The ECB’s 
analytical framework as well as the methods and models deployed therein will, 
therefore, be subjects of intense debates, theoretical controversies still being em-
pirically unresolved. Amongst the numerous issues that need to be dealt with 
the following are only indicative. What has the relative impact of money and 
credit been on prices and economic activity both in normal and disinfl ationary 
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conditions, compared to the effects of policy rates? And how and to what extent 
has monetary analysis informed the ECB’s reaction function respectively? What 
is, thus, likely to be the added value of monetary analysis to the ECB’s policy 
framework, regardless of its formal acknowledgement, or lack thereof (for a fa-
vourable view, see Rostagno et al., 2019)? What drives infl ation and how can the 
episodes of “missing disinfl ation”, after the onset of the Great Recession, and 
“missing infl ation”, in the period of economic recovery, be explained (for exam-
ple, see Ehrmann et al., 2020 and references therein; Arrigoni et al., 2020)? Is 
the Phillips curve still alive and useful in macroeconomic analysis (for example, 
see Ball and Mazumder, 2020; for a deeply skeptical, yet thoroughly argued view 
on the Phillips curve, Forder, 2014)? What is -and should be- the place of (still 
evolving) general equilibrium models with heterogenous agents in the ECB’s 
macroeconomic analysis, especially in regard to the analysis and prediction of 
the effects of unconventional monetary policies on prices , economic activity and 
income distribution? 
Historical experience, however little by other central banks’ standards, pro-
vides enough evidence to suggest that the 2020 review of the ECB’s monetary 
policy strategy is most likely to be yet another instance of both confl icting policy 
preferences being in full force and the conservative preferences of policy makers 
from core euro area countries weighing heavier. The outcome of the review pro-
cess is, therefore, likely to cause little excitement, at least as far as the theoreti-
cal consistency of the monetary policy framework and the coherence of the ECB’s 
strategy are concerned. 
Be that as it may, the ECB’s monetary policy can no longer be the only game 
in town. Monetary easing has been facing increasing constraints; its stabiliza-
tion potential has been receding, whilst its side-effects have been reinforced. 
And criticism has, therefore, been getting harsher.35 Regardless of its potency 
-which is nonetheless disputed- “helicopter money” is a form of fi scal policy, also 
raising issues of coordination between monetary and fi scal authorities, thereby 
jeopardising the principle of central bank independence (Reichlin et al. 2019; 
Davies, 2020). One may thus plausibly allege that this policy option is simply 
out of the ECB’s reach. 
Thus, an active fi scal policy is much needed, primarily in countries with 
fi scal space. What is more, so long as interest rates are lower than rates of eco-
nomic growth -as they will in all likelihood be in the foreseeable future- a rea-
sonable increase in public debt is both desirable and feasible, that is, fi scally not 
costly (Blanchard, 2019). Not only are pressures for debt monetization literally 
non-existent but, as Marco Buti (2020) has brilliantly argued, a monetary-fi scal 
paradox is thereby thwarted; namely, when monetary policy is at the zero lower 
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bound, excessive fi scal prudence is tantamount to a form of fi scal dominance, in 
the sense that fi scal sluggishness impedes the ECB’s monetary policy to fulfi ll 
its primary objective (p. 8). As a matter of fact, Mario Draghi had long made the 
case for a more balanced stabilization policy, entailing fi scal expansion (and/or 
accelerating structural reforms), but to no avail. Adequate fi scal expansion is 
currently not on offer – and, in general, credibly countercyclical fi scal policies are 
institutionally circumscribed. 
What is more, achieving an appropriate euro area fi scal stance -allowing 
for short-term stabilisation and ensuring long-tern sustainability, the trade-offs 
notwithstanding- while paying little regard to national fi scal positions and little 
attention to structural asymmetries in spending and saving patterns makes lit-
tle sense. In fact, it only tends to perpetuate “the paradox of thrift”, which stems 
from the (institutionally required) excess saving in countries with no fi scal space 
and results in growth fragility (Lagarde, 2019), while reinforcing asymmetries 
amongst euro area countries. An appropriate euro area fi scal stance could thus 
be attained if only a central fi scal capacity was established. However, such a 
prospect is hardly acceptable by core euro area countries; it entails risk-shar-
ing, encourages moral hazard and activates transfers to peripheral euro area 
countries, as their arguments go. Yet, the European monetary union has been a 
“transfer union from the start” (Perotti and Soons, 2020; Wolf, 2019); trade and 
fi nancial integration resulted in implicit fl ows from the periphery to the core, 
such fl ows having been not resisted. Herein lies the fundamental asymmetry in 
the political economy of the euro – a deep fl aw, which cannot be rectifi ed by the 
ECB on its own. The truism remains: monetary policy can only go so far. 
Notes
1. Ben Bernanke had famously quipped, while being chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, that “the problem with quantitative easing is that it works in prac-
tice, but it doesn’t work in theory” (Bernanke, 2014; an opposing argument is 
developed in Farmer and Zabczyk, 2016). 
2. Drawing a comparison between the US, the UK and continental Europe’s 
economic performance in the 1990s, Mervyn King had argued thus: “In the 
United States growth was so rapid that at least two authors wrote books enti-
tled ‘The Roaring Nineties’ and another chose the title ‘The Fabulous Decade’. 
In contrast, continental Europe experienced slow growth and heart-search-
ing over structural reforms. As with much else, our economic performance 
lay somewhere between the excited exuberance of the United States and the 
relative disappointment of continental Europe. So the UK experienced a non-
infl ationary consistently expansionary - or “nice” - decade; a decade in which 
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growth was a little above trend, unemployment fell steadily, and, supported 
by the improved terms of trade, real take-home pay rose without adding to 
employers’ costs, thus allowing consumption to grow at above trend rates 
without putting upward pressure on infl ation.” (King, 2003). 
3. Following the worsening of the medium-term outlook for the UK economy, as 
evidenced in the infl ation forecasts released by the Bank of England in May 
2008, an article titled “The start of the nasty decade?” appeared in the opinion 
page of the Financial Times, May 16, 2008. 
4. In June 2013, Raghuram Rajan, who had recently been appointed governor 
of the Reserve Bank of India, gave the fi rst Andrew Crockett Memorial Lec-
ture. In his closing remarks he asserted that central banks had “offered [them-
selves] as the only game in town” (in Tucker, 2018, p. 535). = was later adopted 
by Mohamed El-Erian as the title of his much-cited book (El-Erian, 2016).
5. Although it deserves a place in the main text, a brief reference to the op-
erational framework and the monetary policy measures of the ECB, as there 
were initially set up, is made in this footnote, only for reasons of economy. 
Thus, the operational framework for implementing the monetary policy pref-
erences of the ECB consisted of the following sets of instruments: open mar-
ket operations, standing facilities and minimum reserve requirements. The 
monetary policy preferences of the ECB are revealed via its setting of three 
key interest rates, namely the rate on the main refi nancing operations, the 
rate on the deposit facility and the rate on the marginal lending facility. Fur-
thermore, pursuant to Article 14.4 of the Statute of the European System 
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (Protocol No 4, OJ C 
326/230, 26.10.2012), which sets the broad rules and the procedures govern-
ing national central banks’ functions outside of normal monetary policy op-
erations, an Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) facility was established 
– and the relevant rules and procedures were operationally specifi ed by the 
Governing Council. Following the global fi nancial crisis and the crisis in the 
euro area, the ECB has at various stages added new instruments and intro-
duced several non-standard monetary policy measures, discussion on which 
is made in the next section (for a detailed description of the operational in-
struments and the monetary policy measures of the ECB, see https://www.
ecb.europa.eu/ home /html /index.en.html). 
6. However, a higher weight on interest rate smoothing compared to output 
stabilisation requires an even longer policy horizon. Generally, though, the 
optimal horizon is longer when the objective of price stability is specifi ed as a 
price level target than when its quantifi cation takes the form of an infl ation 
target (Smets, 2003). 
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7. As a matter of fact, ECB President Wim Duisenberg was at pains to explain 
that there would be no tolerance of (prolonged) defl ation on the part of the 
Governing Council – as recalled in the introductory quotation to this section. 
8. Following a coordinated step by national central banks in the euro area, poli-
cy rates were reduced to 3% in December 1998; and that had effectively been 
the short-term interest rate bequeathed to the ECB, in other words the policy 
rate at which the ECB started its monetary policy operations when the third 
stage of the European economic and monetary union was launched, in Janu-
ary 1999 (Hartmann and Smets, 2018, p. 14). 
9. Persistent Infl ation differentials across regions are surely observed in other 
monetary unions too, although their size is (much) smaller than that within 
the euro area (Darvas and Wolff, 2014). What is more, infl ation differentials 
matter less in fully-fl edged economic and monetary unions -in effect, political 
unions- featuring inter alia centralised fi scal capacity. 
10. Of course, raising the issue of compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact 
does not in any way imply -and is not meant to imply herein- that the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact is economically sound. In other words, the argument 
made here, relating fi scal stability to observance of the Stability and Growth 
Pact, has no normative relevance other than legalistic. 
11. ECB President Wim Duisenberg could hardly make it more explicit. As he 
argued in one of his public speeches “… political pressures on monetary policy 
to facilitate or ‘reward’ developments on the fi scal and structural side would 
raise uncertainty about the objectives of monetary policy, thereby endanger-
ing credibility and reducing the benefi ts associated with the maintenance of 
price stability.” (Duisenberg, 2001).
12. Note that, during the period 2000-2007, the average annual rate of growth of 
M3 was 7.2%, the benchmark being 4.5% (Koutsiaras and Manouzas, 2016, 
pp. 12, 43). 
13. Leaving aside legal controversies, one should acknowledge that, although 
both refi nancing operations and sovereign bond purchases provide liquidity 
to the banking system directly, sovereign bond purchases provide liquidity to 
governments too, albeit indirectly. Moreover, if the market value of collater-
alised bonds is adequately haircut, as can reasonably be assumed, refi nanc-
ing operations are relatively risk-free, whereas sovereign bond purchases are 
inherently risky; governments may default on their debts (Brunnermeier et 
al., 2016, p. 344). 
14. Patrick Honohan, who was at that time Governor of the Central Bank of Ire-
land (and member of the ECB’s Governing Council), takes the view that the 
“more obvious policy would have been to wait” (Honohan, 2019, p. 92). Yet, as 
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he acknowledges, custom -“[a] degree of deference to the views of the presi-
dent is inevitable in such matters”(p. 92)- and, perhaps mostly, a success-
ful negotiation on his part to avert a technical change in ECB bank lending 
rules that would have hurt Irish interests, did not allow Governor Honohan 
to make his opposition to the rate increase explicit. Who says that the ECB’s 
monetary policy is politics-proof? 
15. Interestingly, presenting himself to the European Parliament, in June 2011, 
Mario Draghi argued the case against monetary easing (Mody, 2018, pp. 295-
96). Not much later, though, he was going to change course. 
16. Ashoka Mody has forcefully argued that, contrary to widespread beliefs (for 
example, see Buti, 2020), the Deauville agreement did not cause panic in 
bond markets; the agreement was misinterpreted by analysts, not markets 
(Mody, 2018, pp. 276-278). 
17. See footnote 13.
18. One should bear in mind that the price -and yield- of government bonds is not 
impervious to central banks’ collateral policy and investor-of-last-resort in-
terventions; indeed, it is endogenous to such central banks’ policies. And this 
implies that the central banks’ balance-sheet risk is lower than often thought. 
19. Old habits die hard. 
20 In order to lessen that risk, the ECB had put a cap on the amount of Bank of 
Greece’s purchases of Greek treasury bills via ELA; the cap had been set at 
the level of 3.5 billion euros. 
21. In an interesting study of the central bank elite, Mikael Wendschlag (2018, p. 
183) maintains that, in general, the economic and political context “seems to 
pick” its distinct type of central bank governors. Yet, somehow paradoxically, 
he also observes that changes in central bank practices “appear to be” closely 
related to changes in leadership. One might wish to approach the remaining 
part of this section as an evidence-based discussion of Mario Draghi’s attes-
tation to either of the two interpretations. This paper does not have such an 
explicit intention; yet, it implicitly sides with the fi rst interpretation. 
22. In 2015, the European Court of Justice ruled OMT legal; yet, it also ruled that 
there are limits to the ECB’s discretion in that respect.
23. See, https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/milestones/shared/pdf
 /2012-06 29_euro_area_summit_statement_en.pdf. 
24. A word of caution is in order here: this nexus could well be less dismal than 
commonly thought. It is argued that self-fulfi lling pessimism about a coun-
try’s solvency is mostly sourced in foreign banks’ lack of soft information on 
the local economy and the capacity of the issuing government. The nexus 
could thus allow a country to resist the dismal implications of foreign banks’ 
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panicked sales of domestic assets; that is, domestic banks, enjoying soft infor-
mational advantages, could act as byers of last resort (Saka, 2020). 
25. Responding to concerns about profi tability raised by European banks -but of-
fi cially sticking to the transmission argument- the ECB’s Governing Council 
decided in September 2019 to introduce a two-tier system for reserve remu-
neration. Thus, part of the excess liquidity of banks held with the Eurosystem, 
amounting to a multiple of a bank’s minimum reserve requirements, will be 
exempted from the -0.50% deposit rate. The size of the multiplier -currently 
at the level of 6- is subject to adjustments (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/
two-tier/html/index.en.html.). Clearly, the two-tier system is more in favour 
of credit institutions in countries where deposits exceed loans (for example, in 
Germany or France), rather than where banks are market-funded. 
26. “There’s a German word for negative rates”, https://ftalphaville.ft.c
om/2019/09/13/1568375752000/ There-s-a-German-word-for-negative-rates/. 
Also, “ECB boosting Euroscepticism in Germany?”, https://www.eurotopics.
net/en/152285/ecb-boosting-euroscepticism-in-germany#.
 It is important to note that by 2019, 60% of German banks were charging 
negative rates on corporate savings accounts and more than 20% were doing 
the same for retail deposit accounts; “Most German banks are imposing nega-
tive rates on corporate clients”, Financial Times, November 18, 2019. See also 
footnote 25. 
27. To put it precisely, the maturity of borrowed liquidity was conditional on 
banks achieving certain lending thresholds. Calculation of lending thresholds 
was based on the amount of past bank lending. Given that past lending was 
low at that time, thresholds were not hard to achieve. However, banks were 
dissatisfi ed (Fontan, 2018, p. 176). 
28. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omo/tltro/html/index.en.html. 
29. This paragraph, including quoted phrases, draws fully on https://www.ecb.
europa.eu/mopo/implement/ omt/html/index.en.html. 
30. That limit had initially been set at 25%; it was raised to 33% in September 
2015. 
31. With the exception of Greece which did not have access to the QE programme 
owing to its failure to satisfy certain technical requirements. 
32. That is how Mervyn King responded to Raghuram Rajan’s suggestion that 
central banks had become the only game in town (cited in Tucker, 2018, p. 
535). See also footnote 4. 
33. Mikael Wendschlag (2018, p. 207) argues that, following the crisis, the “aca-
demically founded ‘credibility’” of central bankers has been questioned and 
that a transformation of central bank elites is currently in the making. And 
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he observes that, as calls for more democratic accountability of the central 
banks and policy makers have gained force, a “return of the politically vested 
central banker of the post-Second World War decades” is underway. Partly 
at least, the appointment of Christine Lagarde to the presidency of the ECB 
seems to confi rm Wendschlag’s observations; and the same applies -perhaps 
to an even larger extent, for obvious institutional and political reasons- to the 
case of Jerome Powell, who was appointed to the Fed Chair in February 2018. 
Both Lagarde and Powell are lawyers by training, specialising in fi nance, and 
have spent some time in government posts. See also footnote 21. 
34. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200123~3b8d9fc08d.
en.html. 
35. Following the announcement in September 2019 of a new round of mone-
tary easing measures, six former central bankers -two amongst them being 
also former members of the ECB’s executive board- signed a memorandum 
in which the ECB was severely criticised for its monetary policy being ultra-
loose and potentially undermining the central bank’s independence; “Memo-
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